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Abstract 
Do traders incur additional costs for their cross-border trade in sub-Saharan 
Africa?  This paper uses unique high-frequency data on prices of two agricultural 
goods to examine the additional costs incurred in cross-border trade between Niger 
and Nigeria, as well as trade between ethnically distinct markets within Niger.  We 
find a sharp and significant conditional price change of about 20 to 25 percent 
between markets immediately across the national border.  We also find that price 
change significantly diminished when markets on either side of the border share a 
common ethnicity.  Focusing on markets in Niger only, we find the presence of a 
within-country ethnic border effect, almost as large as the between-country national 
border effect.  Our results suggest that having a common ethnicity reduces the 
transaction costs associated with agricultural trade, especially in communications 
and credit transactions.  
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1. Introduction 
There is general agreement among economists that international trade 
promotes an efficient allocation of resources, and that factors increasing trade costs 
may therefore impose a deadweight loss in social welfare.  There is also evidence 
that trade contributes to economic growth (Frankel and Romer 1999, Feyrer 2008).  
These benefits from trade are an important motivation for research that examines 
the extent to which national borders hinder trade among industrialized countries, 
notably by considering the differences in price dispersion between locations on 
opposite sides of a national border as compared to locations within the same country 
(Engel and Rogers 1996; Parsley and Wei 2001; Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh and Li 
2011).1   
 The allocative and growth effects of international trade may well be greater 
for low-income countries than for high-income economies.  Yet even with this 
greater motivation for estimating the border effects in low-income countries, there 
has been limited research on the border effect across and within developing 
countries, presumably due to the absence of high-frequency price data on narrowly 
defined goods in spatially distinct locations.2  By contrast, we construct monthly 
consumer prices for two agricultural goods — millet and cowpeas — from 70 
markets in Niger and northern Nigeria between October 1999 and September 2007.  
In addition, we have data on a variety of factors that may affect price differences 
                                                 
 
1
 The magnitude of these estimates has been questioned by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) who show that 
differences in underlying price volatility across countries contribute to the estimated border effect.     
2 Research on the border effect in developing countries includes Morshed (2007) and Araujo-Bonjean, Aubert 
and Egg (2008). 
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across markets, including rainfall, market size, the geographic location of the 
market, road distances and fuel prices. 
Focusing on agricultural goods that are arguably homogenous, we estimate 
the additional transaction costs incurred when markets are located in different 
countries, conditional on other factors.  In the absence of formal trade barriers or 
natural impediments between these two countries, we interpret these additional 
costs as border effects, similar to the interpretation given by Gopinath, Gourinchas, 
Hsieh and Li (2011, henceforth GGHL). 
In line with the macroeconomics literature on border effects in industrialized 
countries, we first examine the cross-border price differences of market pairs 
between countries, as compared with the same differences within each country 
(Engel and Rogers 1996).  Controlling for transport costs and local market 
conditions, we find that price differences are relatively more responsive within 
countries rather than between countries.  The regression-based estimate of the 
border effect is 2 to 3 percent for both commodities.  This is quite modest as 
compared to results found for industrialized countries.   
Recognizing the omitted variables bias associated with this market-pair 
approach, we build upon the single market analysis employed by GGHL to evaluate 
the change in the price of a product in one market that is supposedly relocated just 
across the border.  Using this single market approach, we find a price change at the 
border of 17 to 26 percent for millet, and a slightly larger effect for cowpeas.   
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A novel feature of our study is the examination of the role of ethnicity on 
trade, both across international borders and across de facto spatial separation of 
ethnic groups within Niger.  To our knowledge, this is the first study of the effects of 
ethnic diversity on domestic and cross-border trade.3  Our study relies on two facts 
to measure these effects.  First, the Niger-Nigeria border, created in the wake of the 
1884–85 Berlin Conference, was drawn to divide an ethnically homogeneous region, 
similar to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Awiwaju 1985).  Second, ethnic 
groups within Niger cluster in distinct geographic regions, creating a de facto 
separation among ethnic groups — an “ethnic border” — within the country.   
We use these facts to analyze the effect of common ethnicity on mitigating 
differences in prices across the national border.  We also examine whether the 
spatial ethnic separation drives price differences between ethnic regions of Niger in 
a way similar to the between-country national border.  We find that common 
ethnicity mitigates the costs of cross-border trade: prices are more closely 
arbitraged between the Hausa regions of Niger and Nigeria than between cross-
border markets that do not share a common ethnic composition.  We also find that 
the cost of trade across the internal ethnic border is 17–20 percent, similar to that of 
trade across the international border.   
We provide further but somewhat more speculative evidence on the 
mechanisms behind the internal border effect by examining traders’ characteristics 
                                                 
 
3 Studies of cross-border trade in West Africa have typically been restricted to a few locations and time periods 
(Azam 2007).  Araujo-Bonjean et al. (2008) estimate a vector autoregression model using monthly market-level 
grain price data for markets in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso and find a statistically significant border effect 
within the CFA zone.  
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and behavior close to the ethnic border.  While markets on either side of the border 
engage in cross-border trade and have similar geographic characteristics and 
institutions, there are significant differences in language, the gender composition of 
traders and borrowing and lending behavior between the two groups.  We posit that 
these differences have important implications for the role of intra-ethnic social 
networks in lowering the transaction costs associated with trade.  This is consistent 
with a substantial literature on rural institutions in Africa (Fafchamps 2001) as 
well as with global evidence documenting the effects of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization on outcomes such as growth (Easterly and Levine 1997), 
corruption (Mauro 1995), contributions to local public goods (Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly, 1999) and participation in groups and associations (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2000).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the context 
of our empirical study by discussing some relevant characteristics of the regions, 
including agricultural trade patterns, the geographic nature of ethnic groupings and 
the establishment of the international border.  Section 3 describes our data, 
followed by Section 4 discussing the empirical strategy.  Section 5 presents the 
results for the international border effect.  Section 6 investigates the role of ethnic 
diversity in creating internal barriers and the potential microeconomic mechanisms 
behind this border effect.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Trade, Markets, and Ethnicity in Niger and Nigeria  
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2.1. Historical Roots of Trade between Niger and Nigeria 
Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and the lowest-ranked 
country on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (UNDP 2011).  The 
majority of the population consists of rural subsistence farmers, who depend upon 
rainfed agriculture as their main source of food and income.  As a landlocked 
country, Niger depends upon trade with its contiguous neighbors, primarily the 
coastal countries of Benin and Nigeria, but also the landlocked countries of Burkina 
Faso and Mali. 
Niger’s trade links with Nigeria have a long and rich history.  In the 
centuries prior to the arrival of the colonial powers, the Hausa ethnic group in 
modern-day northern Nigeria and Niger was linked to the rest of the continent 
through a set of long-distance trading routes.  One of these was the trans-Saharan 
trade route connecting Katsina and Kano (Nigeria) to Tripoli (Libya) via Niger.  
Trade along this route was primarily in slaves, textiles, livestock, grains and salt.  
A second route was the westward trade in kola nuts between Niger and Nigeria and 
what is now Ghana (Hashim and Meager 1999). 
The 1,500-km border between the French colony of Niger and the British 
colony of Nigeria was established in the wake of the 1884–85 Berlin Conference.  
The placement of the border reflected the opposing territorial interests of the 
French and British colonial administrations; the French government wanted access 
to Chad across southern Niger, thus moving the border from the northern desert 
regions to a location within the arable zone further south, while the British 
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government insisted that the Hausa-Fulani kingdoms of northern Nigeria be kept 
intact.  The border that emerged in 1906 divided the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri 
ethnic groups between the two countries.4  It also created a Niger that included 
eight primary ethnic groups (Hausa, Songhai/Zarma, Toureg, Fulani, Kanuri, Arab, 
Toubou and Gourmantche) that were, for the most part, situated in geographically 
distinct regions (Figure 1).5   
Few road networks were developed to link Niger and Nigeria during the 
colonial period, and, as a result, there were relatively few official border crossings 
by the time of Niger’s and Nigeria’s independence in 1960.  As building more 
crossing stations was a low priority for the newly independent states, the Niger-
Nigeria border was relatively porous post-independence.  Both countries have been 
members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) since the 
mid-1990s.  ECOWAS is a regional customs union that allows trade in locally-
produced agricultural products (such as millet, sorghum, maize and cowpeas) to be 
largely free of trade restrictions or governmental regulations.  In addition, there are 
no natural barriers separating the countries.6 
  
2.2. Present-Day Agricultural Trade 
                                                 
 
4 The Niger-Nigeria border created a “partitioned culture area” among Hausa and Fulani populations (Asiwaju 
1985).  At the outset of the international demarcation, inhabitants with farmland straddling the boundary had 
to choose one colonial side or the other, as French subjects were not supposed to farm on British territory, and 
vice versa (Miles 2005).  
5 A map of Nigeria in 1957–58 suggests that the geographic location of ethnic groups is similar to the 
ethnographic maps for 2008.   
6 The Niger River is the principal river of West Africa.  The river’s source starts in Guinea and empties into the 
Niger Delta in southern Nigeria.  While the river traverses both Niger and Nigeria, it only forms a border 
between Niger and Benin, rather than between Niger and Nigeria.   
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Trade in agro-pastoral products within and between Niger and northern 
Nigeria is conducted through a system of traditional markets, each of which is held 
on a weekly basis.  Markets are primarily located in a specific geographic area, such 
as a village, town or urban center.  The density of grain markets within each 
country varies considerably by geographic region, with inter-market distances for 
which trade occurs ranging from 10 km to over 1,000 km.  The number of traders 
operating on each market ranges from 24 to 353, with retailers accounting for over 
50 percent of all traders. 
In this study we focus on two of the most heavily traded goods in these 
markets, millet and cowpea.  Millet is a staple grain in both countries and is 
produced and consumed in almost all regions, especially those located near the 
Niger-Nigeria border.  Cowpea is produced in most agro-climatic zones of both 
countries and functions as a cash crop for rural households.  Both commodities are 
heavily traded across the Niger-Nigeria border, although with different trade flows.  
While cross-border trade occurs throughout the year, millet is more heavily 
imported into Niger from Nigeria during the pre-harvest period, and cowpea is more 
heavily exported from Niger to Nigeria immediately after the harvest. 
Aker (2010) shows that millet and cowpeas are relatively homogeneous goods 
in these markets, and that there do not appear to be systematic price premiums 
either within or across markets based upon size or color of the commodity.  Despite 
attempts to introduce improved varieties over the course of the past decade, the 
primary type of millet cultivated and sold in southern Niger and northern Nigeria is 
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pearl millet, Pennisetum glaucum (Ndjeunga and Nelson 2005); the primary cowpea 
variety is black-eyed cowpea (Lambot 2000).7  Nevertheless, we attempt to address 
potential concerns about the homogeneity of these goods, and the services provided 
across markets, in a later section. 
Despite the absence of natural or political barriers to trade between the two 
countries, there are several potential barriers to trade in agro-pastoral goods at the 
international border.  One possible source of trade friction arises from currency 
exchange costs between the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc of Niger 
and the Nigerian Naira.8  Furthermore, there are often costs due to delays at the 
border (waiting for customs papers) or bribes paid to police officers and customs’ 
officials.9  Finally, linguistic differences (between the official languages of Niger and 
Nigeria, French and English, respectively) could also add to transaction costs if 
trade is conducted in these languages. 
  
3. Data 
This study constructs five primary and secondary datasets.  The first includes 
monthly market-level consumer price data for millet and cowpea over an eight-year 
                                                 
 
7 The color of cowpeas in West Africa can be white, black, brown or red (Lambot 2000).  In Niger, white and red 
cowpea varieties are available, but for all of the markets in our sample, only white cowpeas were available.   
8 There was a devaluation of the CFA in 1994, and the CFA is currently pegged to the Euro zone.  While both of 
these events could affect the CFA-Naira exchange rate, they predate our sample period.   
9 Some authors (e.g., Azam 2007) have noted that banditry can be an important cost in the cross-border of 
certain goods across the border.  Banditry and theft does not appear to be an issue in the trade of agricultural 
products.  According to our transporter survey conducted between 2005 and 2007, fewer than 5% of transporters 
had items stolen during transport over the two-year period, and none of these transporters cited banditry as a 
primary constraint to trade.   
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period from October 1999 to September 2007.10  These data were collected from 
Niger’s Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) and include prices from 70 
markets in Niger and northern Nigeria.  The price data from Nigerian markets 
were also collected by Niger’s AMIS, in Naira, and converted into CFA using the 
CFA/Naira exchange rate of that day.  We do not have access to the original price 
data in Naira nor the daily CFA/Naira exchange rate used for the price conversion. 
The second dataset includes information on the latitude and longitude of each 
market and of the Niger-Nigeria border.  These data allow us to calculate the 
Euclidean distances for market pairs and to control for the distance from each 
market to the international border. 
The third dataset includes monthly data on gasoline prices and the 
CFA/Naira exchange rate, as well as market-level monthly data on rainfall, the date 
of mobile phone coverage and road quality.  These data were collected from a 
variety of primary and secondary sources, including the Direction de la Meteo, the 
mobile phone companies, and the Nigerien oil company (SONIDEP). 
 The fourth dataset is based on a unique survey of traders, transporters and 
market resource persons collected by one of the authors between 2005 and 2007.  
These survey data draw on interviews with 400 traders and 205 farmers located in 
35 markets and 40 villages across Niger and northern Nigeria.  The data contain 
information about the ethnic composition of traders on each market, which also 
reveals where ethnic groups are geographically located within a country.  
                                                 
 
10 Price data are the average price in the market on a particular market day for a given weight.   
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The fifth dataset includes information on the ethnic composition of villages 
and markets located in the area that divides the Hausa and Zarma ethnic regions of 
Niger.  The dataset includes the latitude and longitude of each village, the date of 
the village’s creation, the current ethnic composition of village residents and the 
ethnic composition of the village in 1960, the year of Niger’s independence. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for both countries between October 1999 
and September 2007.  Panel A includes data for market pairs located within each 
country, whereas Panel B includes data for markets located within 250 km of the 
international border.  The average price (CFA/kg) for millet during this time period 
was higher in Niger, with a statistically significant difference between the two 
countries (Panel B).  This is consistent with the prevailing direction of trade, as 
Niger is a net importer of millet from Nigeria.  By contrast, average cowpea prices 
are lower in Niger (although the difference is not statistically significant), as Niger 
exports cowpeas to Nigeria.  Markets have slightly more traders in northern Nigeria, 
and are more likely to be located in an urban center.  However, we do not reject the 
equality of means for most observable characteristics of markets located within 250 
km of the international border, with the exception of the prevalence of traders from 
the Zarma ethnic group.   
Figure 1 shows the international border between Niger and northern Nigeria, 
as well as the location of ethnic groups along the border.11  As shown in this figure, 
                                                 
 
11 A map of Nigeria in 1957–58 suggests that the geographic location of ethnic groups is similar to the 
ethnographic maps for 2008.   
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as well as in Table 1, the Nigerian markets in our sample are only composed of the 
Hausa and Kanuri ethnic groups.12 
  
4.  Empirical Strategy 
We measure the border effect using two empirical strategies.  First, we 
conduct a market-pair analysis.  Similar to analyses conducted in other studies (e.g., 
GGHL), we aim to answer the question whether price gaps are larger when markets 
are separated by country than when they are not, conditional on other factors such 
as the transport cost between the markets.  
Second, we consider one market on either side of the border.  Our approach 
closely follows the one used by GGHL.  Hereafter, we refer to this as the single-
market analysis.  In this case we measure the border effect as the change in the 
price (in logarithm) of a good from selling it in another market immediately across 
the border, focusing on price levels rather than price gaps.  We control for the 
distance between a market location and the border in order to isolate a change in 
price at the border.  This change implies an additional transaction cost imposed 
solely by the border. 
 
4.1. Market-Pair Analysis 
Our regression model for the market-pair analysis is the following: 
                                                 
 
12 While members of the Zarma ethnic group live within Nigeria, they constitute a small percentage of the 
population (0.001 percent) and are geographically focused in the northwest region of the country, near the 
Benin-Niger border.  
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where " and " are the prices (in CFA), at time t in market i and market j, 
respectively.13 “” is a binary variable equal to one if market i and market j 
are in different countries (Niger or Nigeria) and zero if both markets are in the 
same country;  and  are vectors of time-varying variables such as drought and 
mobile phone coverage for market i and market j, respectively;  is a vector of 
time-invariant observables shared by market i and market j;  and  are fixed 
effects for market i and market j, respectively;  denotes the monthly time effect; 
and   is the mean-zero disturbance term.   
In this model,  represents the average increment in the difference between 
log prices — equivalently, the percent change in the magnitude of the price ratio — 
exclusively attributable to crossing an international border, conditional on market-
level observables and transport costs between markets.  However, for a pair of 
markets located in different countries and far away from the border, country-level 
unobserved heterogeneities can confound the border effect.  For our estimation 
sample, we therefore consider market pairs no more than 250 kilometers apart, the 
mean distance between markets in our sample.  To check the robustness of the 
results, we also use alternative measures of inter-market distance, namely, those 
markets that are no more than 150 kilometers apart.  As differences in underlying 
                                                 
 
13 Most market-pair analyses regress a measure of price dispersion between two markets on a binary variable 
that equals one if the two markets are separated by a border (Engel and Rogers 1996, Parsley and Wei 2001, 
and Ceglowski 2003).  GGHL also use a price gap analysis, with the same dependent variable as the one used in 
our specification. 
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price volatility in two countries can bias the estimate of the border effect upward 
(Gorodnichenko and Tesar 2009),14 we also include indicator variables for country-
specific pairs. 
 
4.2. Single-Market Analysis 
As suggested above, the effects of unobserved heterogeneity might be 
mitigated by restricting the sample to markets within a certain distance of each 
other.  An alternative approach to controlling for this source of unobserved 
heterogeneity is to limit the sample to markets located very close to the border.  Our 
second approach estimates the effect on a single market price of moving from one 
country to another for markets close to the international border.  The rationale for 
this approach is that markets located close to each other are likely to share, on 
average, common observable and unobservable characteristics.15  This is 
particularly relevant in our context, as the Niger-Nigeria border is not formed by 
natural features such as rivers, lakes or mountains. 
Our regression model for the single-market analysis of the international 
border effect is the following (GGHL 2011): 
(2)    " 
 #  #$%&''#(  #$%& ) (   # #*  +   !  
where " denotes the price of a good, measured in CFA, sold in market i at time t; 
“$%&” is a binary variable equal to one if market i is in Niger and zero if market i 
                                                 
 
14 Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) control for country-specific variability by including indicator variables for 
country-specific market pairs and find vastly different estimates of the US-Canada border effect.   
15 We also conduct analyses for markets located far away from the border as a robustness check, in which cases 
the variation in market conditions would most likely account for most variations in the price.  We find zero 
border effects in those cases. 
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is in Nigeria; ( denotes the algebraic distance16 of market i north of the Niger-
Nigeria border in kilometers (positive for markets in Niger and negative for 
markets in Nigeria);  is a vector of time-varying variables for market i at time t, 
which includes access to mobile phone coverage and experiencing drought;  
includes the latitude and the longitude of market i;17 + denotes the monthly time 
effect; and   is the mean zero disturbance term.  
In the regression model described by equation (2), the border effect is 
represented by #, which captures the percent change in price implied by relocating 
a market just across the border.18  To assess the robustness of our border effect 
estimates, we consider markets located within different bandwidths (5 km, 20 km, 
30 km and 50 km) of the Niger-Nigeria border, as well as higher-order polynomials 
of the distance variable ((). 
 In their main analysis, GGHL restrict the sample to markets within 500 km 
of the U.S.-Canada border, although they find very similar results for bandwidths of 
100 km or 350 km.  Following their approach, we aim to isolate a direct effect of the 
presence of the border separately from the effect of transaction costs that may vary 
with the distance of transporting products across the border, as captured by the 
inclusion of the distance variable.  This is particularly important in our study since 
markets in this area of West Africa have existed for decades, and few of them are 
                                                 
 
16 Here, we use exactly the same term — algebraic distance — as Gopinath et al. (2011).  The algebraic distance 
can be positive or negative. 
17 In this way we attempt to control for location-specific time-invariant unobservable characteristics of market i. 
18 This approach is equivalent to using a uniform kernel regression (Imbens and Lemieux 2008) for an RD 
design. 
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located arbitrarily close to the border.  Thus, this limits our ability to employ the 
standard graphical analysis associated with the RD design.   
 
5. The Niger-Nigeria Border Effect 
In this section we present the estimates from our two methods of analysis, 
with the market-pair results presented in Section 5.1 and the single-market results 
presented in Section 5.2.  While both methods attempt to estimate the price effect of 
the international border, the market-pair analysis tends to deliver a smaller 
estimate, for reasons we explain in Section 5.3.  We also discuss the robustness of 
our results in Section 5.4. 
  
5.1. Market-Pair Analysis 
The market-pair analyses of the effects of the Niger-Nigeria border on the 
price ratios for millet (columns 1–5) and cowpeas (columns 6–10) are presented in 
Table 2.  The sample includes market pairs that are within 250 km of each other, 
implying that no market in the sample is more than 250 km away from the 
international border.19 
Columns (1) and (6) present the estimates of the border effect on the price 
ratio for millet and cowpea, respectively.  For both commodities, the difference in 
the logarithm of prices is equal to about 2 percent and is statistically significant at 
                                                 
 
19 The border effect estimates are robust to an analysis in which we only use market pairs located within 150 
km of the Niger-Nigeria border, even though this cuts the sample by almost half. The results are reported in 
Table A1. 
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conventional levels.  The estimated border effect increases slightly when other 
covariates are included in the regression, such as the log of transport costs, drought, 
urban status and mobile phone coverage (columns 2 and 7).  We take into account 
the possibility that these estimated differences reflect differences in price 
variability within countries, rather than a border effect, by including country fixed 
effects for market pairs that lie within Niger (columns 3 and 8) or Nigeria (columns 
4 and 9).  The stability of the border coefficient estimates across these two 
alternatives (comparing the results in these columns to those in columns 2 and 7, 
respectively) contrasts starkly with the large differences found by Gorodnichenko 
and Tesar (2009) in their analysis of price differentials between the United States 
and Canada.20 
Columns (5) and (10) represent our first examination of the potential role of 
ethnicity in inter-market trade.  The estimations in these columns augment the 
specification of columns (2) and (7) by including two additional binary indicators; 
“same ethnicity,” which equals one if a majority of traders located in both markets 
of a market pair are from the same ethnic group, and the interaction between the 
“same ethnicity” variable and the “Niger-Nigeria border” variable.  In this 
specification, the effect of the Niger-Nigeria border on the difference (in absolute 
value terms) between log prices in two markets with different ethnicities is 
                                                 
 
20 Additional evidence of the unimportance of the Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) effect for this data set is 
obtained by plotting the kernel densities of the residuals from the two country-specific regressions, one for Niger 
and one for Nigeria,   
      	 
           , 
for both millet and cowpea.  The two panels of Figure A1 plot the kernel densities of the residuals from the 
regression model above.  The kernel densities overlay each other very closely, suggesting that the underlying 
variation of market-pair price differences are similar in both countries for millet and cowpea. 
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represented by the coefficient on the “Niger-Nigeria border” variable.  The 
estimated border effect for two markets with a common ethnicity is the sum of the 
coefficient on the border and the coefficient on the interaction term.  The estimated 
effect of having the same ethnicity on the prices in two markets in the same country 
is the coefficient on the “same ethnicity” variable. 
The results presented in column (5) shows that the price ratio for millet, for a 
within-country market pair with the same ethnicity, is about one percent lower 
than the price ratio for a within-country market pair with different ethnicities, 
conditional on other covariates.  The quantitative effect is similar for cowpeas but 
not statistically significant (column 10).  For cross-border markets, having a 
common ethnicity lowers the price ratio by about 8 percent for millet (column 5), 
with a statistically significant effect.  There is no effect of common ethnicity on 
cross-border price ratios for cowpea (column 10).  Overall, these results suggest that 
the ethnic composition of a market pair may play a role in determining transaction 
costs between the two markets, although primarily for millet.  We further explore 
the role of ethnicity in Section 6. 
   
5.2. Single-Market Analysis  
The results of the single-market analysis of the effects of the international 
border are reported in Table 3.  A statistically significant coefficient on the binary 
variable “Niger” indicates a percent change in prices at the border between 
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proximate markets in Niger and Nigeria, conditional on the covariates included in 
the regression model. 
Based on a bandwidth of 5 km, the estimates in Table 3 show that millet 
prices increase by 22.5 percent when crossing from Nigeria to Niger (column 1).  
These findings are robust to the inclusion of other covariates that could affect price 
changes, including monthly time effects, drought and mobile phone coverage 
(column 2).  It is also robust to the inclusion of market fixed effects, as captured by 
the geographic location of the market (column 3).  The results are also robust to 
alternative bandwidth specifications (20 km, 30 km, 50 km and 200 km).  As 
expected, the estimated magnitude of the border effect decreases and becomes less 
statistically significant as the bandwidth increases.  This is due to the fact that a 
greater proportion of the price variation of millet can be explained by the differences 
between Niger and Nigeria rather than by the border per se.   
The border effect for the price of millet is much smaller between markets of 
common ethnicity than between markets with different ethnicities.  This is shown 
by the estimates in the last column of each panel, which restrict the sample to 
markets in the extensive Hausa region that spans the international border.  For 
example, the results in column (4) suggest that prices increase by 7.9 percent when 
crossing the Niger-Nigeria border within the Hausa region, by comparison with 23.8 
percent when comparing cross-border markets that do or do not share the same 
ethnicity.  The impact of ethnicity in mitigating the border effect appears to be even 
more marked when we increase the bandwidth.  
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Table 4 repeats this analysis for cowpea prices.  The results are consistent 
with those for millet.  Cowpea prices change by about 27 percent at the border 
(column 1).  This magnitude decreases once time-variant covariates and monthly 
time effects are included (column 2), but remains robust to the inclusion of time-
invariant covariates, such as the geographic location of the market (column 3).  As 
in the case of millet, common ethnicity mitigates the border effect (column 4): this 
effect is estimated at 20.2 percent for cross-border markets, as compared to close to 
zero (and not statistically significant) for those sharing a common ethnicity. 
   
5.3. Comparing the Two Sets of Estimates 
The magnitude of border effect varies significantly according to the 
estimation strategy, with the market-pair estimates significantly smaller than the 
single-market analysis.  In their study of the U.S.-Canada border effect, GGHL 
(2011) find a similar pattern: Using a market-pair analysis, they find that the 
median price gap is 14.6 percent for cross-border pairs, as compared to a “median 
discontinuous change of 24 percent at the (U.S.-Canada) border” using a single-
market analysis (GGHL 2011).  Why are the magnitudes of the border effect so 
different? 
There are three primary reasons for different magnitudes of the border effect 
between the market-pair and single-market analysis.  The first relates to the 
difference in the definition of the dependent variable.  While the single-market 
approach focuses on the price gap between two markets immediately next to the 
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border (such that the border dummy variable captures the change in price levels of 
markets that are relocated immediately across the border), the market-pair 
analyses control for the distance between two markets of a pair, either or both of 
which could be far away from the border.  In this specification, the “border effect” is 
therefore inferred based on the excessive price gap of cross-border pairs relative to 
the price gap of within-country pairs.  As a result, the border effect obtained from 
market-pair analyses is an average effect of markets located both close to and far 
away from the border.  This average effect could be smaller than the effect for two 
markets local to the border, as heterogeneities in the market conditions of a market 
pair could explain a larger portion of the price gap between the two markets as they 
are situated father away from the border. 
Second, while both the market-pair and the single-market analyses estimate 
the border effect, the underlying population of markets is different.  The market-
pair analysis is aimed at the average border effect for all markets, controlling for 
inter-market distances, whereas the single-market analysis is aimed at the local 
border effect for those markets located immediately next to the border. 
A final difference between the two specifications is the interpretation of the 
border effect.  While the coefficient in the single-market model reflects the full 
unobservable transactions costs associated with crossing the border, the coefficient 
in the market-pair model reflects the difference in cross-border trade as compared 
to within-country trade.  In other words, the single-market analysis captures 
absolute cross-border costs, rather than cross-border costs relative to within-country 
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costs.  For this reason, the single-market analysis coefficient will be larger unless 
the unobservable transactions costs associated with within-country trade are close 
to zero. 
 
5.4. Robustness of the Estimates  
 There are several potential threats to the validity of the above findings.  First, 
observable or unobservable determinants of the prices might systematically differ 
on either side of the border.  In particular, the single-market analysis assumes that 
location relative to the international border is the only determinant of prices that 
changes discontinuously as one moves across the border.  While it is impossible to 
directly test for such an identification assumption, we can test whether the 
observed market-level characteristics are similar within a particular bandwidth.  
Table 5 tests for this more formally by comparing the equality of means for 
characteristics that could affect price levels on either side of the border.  Using both 
the market panel and trader-level datasets, the observable characteristics are 
balanced on either side of the Niger-Nigeria border.  These results suggest that the 
border effect is not serving as a proxy for cross-border differences in observable 
characteristics. 
Second, much of the literature in this field has shown that price gaps are 
highly correlated with exchange rates, and has used exchange rates as an 
exogenous shock to measure the speed and extent of pass-through.  Thus, exchange 
rate fluctuations could be responsible for the observed border effect.  Figure A2 
23 
 
shows the monthly CFA/Naira exchange rate from October 1999 to September 2007.  
There was a significant appreciation of the CFA (relative to the Naira) between 
2000 and 2001, and again between 2002 and 2003.  As all of the Nigerian price data 
were converted into CFA by the AMIS, we do not explicitly control for exchange rate 
fluctuations in the regression.  Therefore, as a robustness check, we estimate the 
border effect using only data from the 2003 to 2007, the period of time during which 
there was less exchange rate volatility.21  The results for the market-pair analyses 
are reported in Table A2.  Overall, the market-pair estimates for the international 
border effect for millet remain very stable at 3 percent, but the Niger-Nigeria border 
effect drops to 1 percent for cowpeas, and is no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  In contrast, results (shown in Tables A3 and A4) from the 
single-market analyses using only the 2003–2007 period are very similar to the ones 
based on 1999–2007.  
An additional threat to the validity of our previous findings is the 
heterogeneity of the goods and services across cross-border markets.  If millet and 
cowpea are not truly homogeneous products, then the border effect could simply be 
a proxy for differences in physical attributes.  Similarly, traders on either side of the 
border could provide different services (such as cleaning, bagging or threshing) that 
are included in the price, which would then appear as a border effect.22   
                                                 
 
21 Results for the market-pair analysis using only the 2003–2007 sample are presented in Table A2, and the 
results based on this period for the single-market analysis are presented in Tables A3 and A4. 
22 For example, Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein (2009) show that prices can vary within cities based upon their 
location and associated amenities.   
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While no agricultural commodity can ever be completely homogeneous in 
terms of size, quality, color and smoothness, Table A5 provides some evidence that 
the physical attributes of millet, as well as the services provided, are similar on 
either sides of the international border.  Using observations from markets located 
within 50 km of the Niger-Nigeria border, the results suggest that there are not 
systematic differences in services, willingness to pay for quality, or the “high-
quality” varieties available on these markets.  Overall, only 25 percent of traders 
provide any type of service, including bagging, cleaning, threshing or drying 
(column 1).  Of these, the primary service provided is bagging; there is not a 
statistically significant difference in these services provided on either side of the 
border (column 2).  81 percent of traders stated that they were willing to pay for 
higher quality, with a slightly higher percentage in markets in northern Nigeria as 
compared with those in Niger (column 3).  While traders in Nigeria stated that they 
were more likely to pay for “quality” as compared with traders in Niger, there is not 
a statistically significant difference at conventional levels.  In addition, the 
availability of higher-quality millet varieties (guero and haini) was similar in both 
Nigerien and Nigerian border markets.  Overall, these results suggest no systematic 
differences in trader’s services and product quality across cross-border markets in 
our sample. 
A final threat to the validity of our findings is the absence of trade between 
cross-border markets.  Although we do not have time series data on trade volumes, 
we provide evidence that traders did in fact engage in trade on either side of the 
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border from our trader-level data (Table A6).  Between 2005 and 2007, 27 percent of 
traders in Nigerien markets located near the border bought and sold millet and 
cowpea in northern Nigeria, and 55 percent of Nigerian traders bought and sold 
agricultural products from Nigerien markets.  There is not a statistically significant 
difference in the average volume bought and sold by traders operating in Niger and 
northern Nigeria during this time period.  This suggests that price effects are not 
reflecting an absence of trade across the Niger-Nigeria border. 
  
6. The Internal Border Effect 
The market-pair and single-market regression results in Section 5 suggest 
that a common ethnicity can diminish the international border effect, primarily for 
millet.  Yet can different ethnic regions create an internal de facto border within a 
country?  Niger offers a good setting for addressing this type of question since there 
is a strong geographic separation among ethnic groups.  While this is a feature of 
many countries within sub-Saharan Africa, we know of no other studies on the 
effect of spatial ethnic diversity on intra-national trade.23 
We begin this section by first defining the ethnic border and its measurement, 
before estimating the impact of internal ethnic borders on prices within Niger.  We 
then offer some potential explanations for the internal ethnic-border effect. 
                                                 
 
23 Michalopoulos (forthcoming) argues that ethnic diversity within a country is driven by differences in land 
quality, particularly between herders and farmers, as well as state institutions and history (particularly the 
colonial period). While these factors might be correlated with overall geographic diversity of certain ethnic 
groups (for example, Touareg pastoralists in the North of Niger and Mali as compared with Hausa and Zarma 
agriculturalists in the South), they do not appear to explain the West-East differences in ethnic group 
composition. 
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6.1. Regression Analysis of the Internal Border 
We use both primary and secondary data on the ethnic composition of 
villages and markets in Niger to identify different ethnic regions and a de facto 
ethnic border.  Using the census and trader-level data, we first calculated the ethnic 
composition of each market, identifying those markets with both low and high 
degrees of ethnic diversity.  Based upon these calculations, we collected additional 
primary data in October 2011 from villages and markets located in the “high ethnic 
diversity” region, but located primarily in the Hausa and Zarma zones of Niger.24  
These data include information on the ethnic composition of residents within each 
village and market, as well as the ethnic composition in 1960 (the time of Nigerien 
independence).  Using these three datasets, we were able to identify the ethnic 
composition of markets and villages within the geographic area of Niger where the 
villages move from exclusively Zarma to exclusively Hausa.  
The results from this exercise are presented in Figure 2.  All of the 
observations are in the Dosso region.  The set of villages in the western part of this 
region, from the western most village of Koikore to the villages of Goubeydé, 
Tsoungoulma, Batama Beri and Daytagui, are all solely Zarma (with the exception 
of one mixed village in the north).  There is a mixed composition of several villages 
directly east of this region, and these villages include either Hausa and Zarma 
                                                 
 
24 While there are other internal ethnic borders within Niger, primarily North-South and between the Hausa 
and Kanuri to the far east, the highest density of markets within our sample occurs within the Hausa-Zarma 
zone.  
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residents or Hausa, Zarma and Fulani residents (the villages of Mamadou, Malam 
Koira, Dogon Dadji and Gaweye).  Further east one sees a switch to solely Hausa 
villages.  
Using these data, we were able to identify the internal ethnic border related 
to these two groups: namely, a set of markets with a high degree of ethnic diversity 
that also separate two geographic regions with a low degree of ethnic diversity.  
Defining those markets and villages with diverse ethnic composition as the “ethnic 
border,” we calculated the Euclidean distance between the markets in our sample 
and this border.25  
Table 6 tests for the equality of means of observable characteristics between 
markets located on either side of the Hausa-Zarma border.  We do not find a 
statistically significant difference for either urban status or the prevalence of 
drought, two of the most important determinants of supply and demand in these 
markets.  Nor is there a difference in a market’s elevation, a characteristic used by 
Michalopoulos (forthcoming) as a determinant of ethnic diversity.  However, 
markets in the Zarma region were more likely to have had mobile phone coverage 
between 1999 and 2007, as mobile phone coverage arrived relatively earlier in the 
Zarma markets.  We therefore control for mobile phone coverage in our regression 
analysis. 
 We estimate the ethnic border effect with the single-market regression: 
(3)  " 
 +  +,-.-''+(  +,-.- ) (   + +*     !  
                                                 
 
25 While we rely on all of the villages in the sub-region to locate the Hausa-Zarma border, our empirical analysis 
is restricted to the subset for which we have price data.   
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where " denotes the price of an agricultural good in CFA sold in market i at time t; 
“,-.-” is a binary variable, which equals one if market i is in the Zarma region of 
Dosso and zero if it is in Hausa region; ( denotes the algebraic distance of market i 
to the Hausa-Zarma border in kilometers (positive for Zarma markets and negative 
for Hausa markets);  is a vector of time-varying variables for market i at time t, 
which includes having mobile phone coverage and experiencing drought;  includes 
the latitude and the longitude of market i, in an effort to control for location-specific 
time-invariant unobservable characteristics;  denotes the monthly time effect; and 
  is the mean zero disturbance term.  The sample only includes Niger markets.  In 
this model, the border effect is represented by +, which implies a price change by 
relocating a market just across the ethnic border.  While the ethnic “border” is not 
defined as sharply as the international border, the clustering of markets by 
ethnicity enables us to locate a set of border villages that divide the Hausa and 
Zarma regions within one section of Niger. 
Table 7 presents the estimates of the Hausa-Zarma border effect for millet.  
For markets within 20 km and 30 km to the ethnic border (which is practically close 
according to our empirical setting), we find statistically significant border effects.  
Using a bandwidth of 20 km, millet prices increase by 21 percent at the internal 
border (column 1).  These results are robust to the inclusion of other covariates that 
may affect price changes, as well as controlling for monthly time effects and the 
market’s latitude and the longitude (column 2).  They are also robust to comparing 
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markets located within a 30-km radius on either side of the border, suggesting that 
prices change by 26 percent at the internal border. 
Because there are few markets located very close to the ethnic border, using 
markets located within 20 km or 30 km to the border could potentially bias the 
border effect estimation.  For markets located father away from the border, the 
border indicator can become an indicator variable for ethnicity, representing an 
ethnic difference (such as difference in preferences) rather than the difference in 
transaction costs incurred at the ethnic border.  For example, if millet is preferred 
and highly demanded in Zarma markets, but not in Hausa markets, then we would 
expect to find a significant price difference between these two regions even with a 
very wide bandwidth, thereby representing an ethnic difference.  In contrast, if 
there is no ethnic difference, but additional transaction costs incurred for cross-
border trade, then we would expect the price difference to be present near the 
border, but absent for markets located far away from the border. 
To implement this check, we select markets located more than 50 or 100 km 
away from the ethnic border and re-estimate equation (3).  If we find a statistically 
significant border effect with these samples, then our previous results in columns 
(1)–(4) could have alternative explanations.  Our results in columns (5)–(8) confirm 
no border effect.  Furthermore, we re-estimate equation (3) using the full sample, 
and still find no effect.  Overall, our check suggests that the choice of markets near 
the ethnic border (that is, the bandwidth) is not a source of bias, and the difference 
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in ethnicity seems to create a substantial transaction cost for millet precisely at the 
ethnic border. 
We repeat the same analyses for cowpea and report the results in Table 8.26  
The results are similar to the ones for millet.  Cowpea prices change by 22 percent 
at the internal border (column 1), a result that is robust to the inclusion of both 
time-invariant and time-variant covariates and monthly time effects (column 2).  
The effect is slightly higher for markets located within 30 km of the internal border 
(columns 3 and 4), but there is no effect for markets located at least 50 km or 100 
km away from the ethnic border, or for the full sample. 
As the ethnic border is not as clearly defined as an international border, this 
could lead to measurement errors in our “distance-to-border” variable.  Nonetheless, 
two characteristics of the estimates presented in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that those 
measurement errors could be minor.  First, our estimates are similar with and 
without controls for the latitude and longitude of each market.27  Second, our 
estimates are similar whether we consider markets within 20 km or 30 km of the 
border.28 
The magnitude of the price effects of the internal ethnic border and the 
international border are quite similar.  Thus, the border costs between the Hausa 
and Zarma regions of Niger appear to be at least as great as those imposed by the 
                                                 
 
26 In the case of markets within 20 and 30 km in Table 8, we were unable to include the “distance” or its 
interaction with the “border” variable in the cowpea regressions due to numerical problems incurred in 
estimation, likely due to rather limited variation in this “distance” variable for cowpea markets.   
27 For markets located on the same latitude or longitude, the measurement errors, likely to be common to these 
markets, would be differenced out with the latitude and longitude fixed effects. 
28 The small number of markets that are very close to the border precludes us from presenting a graphical 
analysis of the discontinuity effect that is typically presented in studies of this type.  
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international border with Nigeria.  The deadweight losses in foregone internal trade 
may correspondingly be of a similar order of magnitude. 
 
6.2. Potential Mechanisms of the Ethnic Border Effect 
Our most striking result is that markets located close to the ethnic border 
have large price discontinuities for homogeneous goods.  Yet Table 6 suggests that 
systematic differences in observed covariates for markets located close to this 
border are not driving the price change at the border.  What could then account for 
the ethnic border effect?  This section presents results from the trader-level survey 
data collected during a subset of our sample period.  The data suggest that ethnicity 
is correlated with differences in language, the gender composition of traders, and 
lending and borrowing behavior, each of which could create additional transaction 
costs to trade across the ethnic border.   
 Language 
If traders are unwilling or unable to communicate with each other, either due 
to linguistic or socio-cultural factors, then language differences could potentially 
increase the transaction costs associated with inter-ethnic trade.  The statistics in 
Table 9 (Panel B) show notable linguistic differences across the Hausa and Zarma 
markets located close to the internal border; while all traders speak Hausa in 
Hausa markets, fewer than 20 percent speak Hausa in Zarma markets (column 2).  
These differences are more pronounced for the Zarma language, as fewer than 1 
percent of traders in Hausa villages speak Zarma.  These effects are partially 
correlated with gender; once controlling for gender, the linguistic gap between the 
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two markets decreases.  Even though price and quantity negotiations between 
Hausa and Zarma traders can be conducted with a very low level of linguistic 
proficiency, this still introduces a cost not present in intra-ethnic trade.  But 
perhaps more importantly, language differences might be correlated with 
difficulties in restraining cheating with respect to quantity or quality, partly (but 
not solely) because language differences reflect an absence of long-run personal 
relationships and a lack of informal community-level enforcement mechanisms.  
Language differences may therefore increase transactions costs indirectly, by 
weakening these second-best enforcement mechanisms.   
 Gender 
While women represent only 6 percent of traders on Hausa markets, they 
comprise over 25 percent of traders in Zarma markets.29  This pattern conforms 
with broader socio-cultural differences in the role of women between the two groups. 
According to anthropological studies, Zarma women are able to travel outside of 
their villages to visit family or engage in trade, a custom that is much less frequent 
among Hausa women (Coles and Mack 1991).  While we do not have direct evidence 
on the degree — if any — of within-village market segmentation by gender, any 
barrier to transactions between men and women will generate a difference in 
                                                 
 
29 This difference in the gender composition of traders becomes more pronounced when moving farther away 
from the ethnic border.  Using the entire sample of Zarma and Hausa markets, only 3 percent of traders are 
women on Hausa markets, as compared with 31 percent of traders on Zarma markets.  
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average prices across the ethnic border.  This restricts the attractiveness of Zarma 
markets for these traders and may reduce the intensity of cross-market arbitrage.30 
 Credit networks 
Agricultural trade involves both spatial and temporal arbitrage, as well as a 
temporal “dissociation” between delivery and payment (Fafchamps 2000).  Both 
supplier and client credit play an important role in agricultural markets in Niger.  
Since little of this credit is allocated via formal financial institutions, much of this 
credit is allocated on the basis of trust (Fafchamps 2000).31  As in other countries 
where firms and traders cannot assess the riskiness of suppliers and clients, 
ethnically-based social networks in Niger play an important role in circulating 
information about credit histories and risk preferences to potential trading 
partners.  
Traders often require financial services to pre-finance their purchases or to 
respond to fluctuating supply and demand.  Table 9 shows that 40 percent of 
traders obtained loans for their business operations, primarily from fellow traders 
(50 percent) or friends and family members (22 percent) (Panel D).  Whereas 60 
percent of traders received supplier credit (with an implicit monthly interest rate of 
7 percent), over 75 percent sold on credit (for a longer duration and higher interest 
                                                 
 
30 Even if Hausa traders are less willing to trade with women in Zarma markets, they could potentially conduct 
the trade with a male trader on the Zarma market, who could then purchase from the female trader.  This 
scenario is unlikely, as a majority of female traders are retailers (as opposed to wholesalers or intermediaries).  
Thus, while female retailers might purchase from male wholesalers, it is unlikely that male wholesalers would 
purchase from female retailers.  This system is somewhat different in the far east of the country, whereby 
wholesalers purchase from intermediaries during certain periods of the year.  However, these intermediaries 
are exclusively male.  The intermediated transaction described above would therefore be subject to additional 
transaction costs. 
31 Fafchamps (2000) points out that an ethnic bias in the attribution of credit can be due to both statistical 
discrimination and network effects.   
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rate).  The prevalence of the use of credit was similar in the Zarma and Hausa 
markets, but the duration of supplier and client credit differed significantly; traders 
in Zarma markets were only able to obtain supplier credit for one week (as 
compared with 2.5 weeks in Hausa markets), and were only able to offer client 
credit for 1.5 weeks (as compared with 3 weeks in Hausa markets).  Most of these 
results remain after controlling for gender (column 3).  Overall, this suggests that 
traders in Zarma markets have a shorter duration of borrowing and lending for 
their commercial operations.   
Table 10 analyzes this question in more detail, controlling for factors that 
could simultaneously be correlated with living in a Zarma market and borrowing 
and lending behavior.  Overall, the patterns are consistent with those in Table 9; 
once controlling for gender, age, experience and firm size, traders in Zarma markets 
have a shorter duration of borrowing and lending for their commercial operations. 
 The difference in the duration of credit Hausa and Zarma markets suggests 
that credit flows predominate within rather than between ethnic groups.  The 
difference in credit terms, in turn, suggests that this is driven at least in part by 
barriers to inter-ethnic trade in credit — that is, to transactions costs that are 
addressed more effectively within ethnic networks than between them.  These 
barriers prevent traders from accessing or granting credit when conducting 
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commodity transactions in cross-border markets, raising the effective transaction 
cost of inter-ethnic trade.32 
 
6.3. Alternative Explanations 
We also use our trader-level data to address some possible alternative 
explanations for our findings.  One set of concerns is that colonial policies or 
historical political factors could have favored one ethnic group over another, thereby 
resulting in different institutions, investments or public services at the village or 
market level.  Table 9 (Panel A) presents results for market-level institutions 
available in Hausa and Zarma markets, as well as potential outcomes correlated 
with institutional investment (such as education, experience and firm size).  If these 
institutions were systematically different on either side of the border, then this 
could be a potential explanation for the observed price gap.  Half of the Hausa 
markets are located near a paved road, and markets impose a market day tax of 75 
CFA/kg.  There are on average 2.8 police controls in place during the market day, 
and an average of 85 agricultural traders (of all types).  On average, traders have 15 
years of experience and four employees.  None of these differences are statistically 
significant between the Hausa and Zarma markets, although on average traders on 
Zarma markets have less experience (column 2).  Controlling for the traders’ gender 
(column 3), the coefficients are in general smaller in magnitude.  Overall, the 
                                                 
 
32 Intra-network credit will generally be an imperfect substitute for credit accessed at the point of transaction: a 
trader encountering a buying opportunity in a cross-border market, for example, must have secured credit from 
his “home” network in advance, a costly proposition when the precise nature of this buying opportunity was 
unknown in advance.  The ethnic border within Niger may therefore reflect, at least in part, the prevalence of 
credit market imperfections and the resulting reliance upon borrowing and lending within ethnic groups. 
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results in Panel A suggest that different institutional environments do not seem to 
explain the ethnic border effect. 
A final threat to the identification of the internal border effect is the absence 
of trade between Hausa and Zarma markets.  For example, if the absence of long-
run relationships across ethnicities translates into higher transaction costs, then 
this could result in autarky.33  Table 9 (Panel C) shows the trading behavior of 
traders on Zarma and Hausa markets.  Traders operating on the border markets 
have similar marketing characteristics: 27 percent of traders are retailers (as 
compared with intermediaries or wholesalers), search for price information in four 
markets and have three primary members in their social network.  Traders 
purchase and sell agricultural commodities in 4.15 markets, with relatively fewer 
markets in the Zarma region.  A majority of traders operate within a 50-km radius, 
although Zarma traders are more likely to trade farther afield and in cross-border 
markets.  These latter differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
and remain significant even after controlling for the gender of the trader.  Thus, 
while spatial arbitrage (and cross-border trade) occurs, this is primarily in close 
proximity and with markets located within the same ethnic region.  Overall, these 
results that the absence of trade between Hausa and Zarma markets is not driving 
the results.   
  
7. Conclusion 
                                                 
 
33 A more formal model showing the linkages between ethnicity, transaction costs and price gaps is provided in 
the Appendix.   
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 Using unique high-frequency data on prices of two agricultural goods, our 
study shows that an international border effect exists between Niger and Nigeria.  
Furthermore, we find that the additional costs incurred in cross-border trades could 
be mitigated between markets having similar ethnic composition — the mitigated 
international border effect suggests that existing regional economic commissions 
may have been somewhat successful in promoting cross-border trade, even across 
currency areas or, alternatively, that longstanding trade routes — namely the one 
that links the Hausa of Northern Nigeria and Niger — continue to influence 
current-day trade pattern.34   
Our results suggest that ethnicity plays an important role in trade for 
agricultural goods: a common ethnicity could facilitate trade between Niger and 
Nigeria, while distinct ethnicities could increase transaction costs, especially for 
markets located at the junction of different ethnic regions.  Focusing on markets in 
Niger only, we find that the within-country ethnic border effect could be as large as 
the between-country national border effect.  One implication of this finding is that 
an ethnic divide could play a central role in the spatial configuration of prices in 
places where legal enforcement and contracts are lacking, but trust and social 
sanctions are binding.
                                                 
 
34 A third hypothesis figures prominently in African studies.  Herbst (2000) argues that since the colonial period, 
the powers that have ruled African capital cities have made mutual bargains not to threaten each other’s 
periphery, and that the international relations regime has acquiesced by conferring de jure status on whomever 
controls the capital city.  Thus, weak states with porous and non-defended borders are a political equilibrium. 
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Appendix 
 
A Model of Ethnicity, Transaction Costs, and Price Gaps 
 
This appendix shows how a transaction cost can affect the equilibrium price 
differential between spatially separated markets.  This cost may be associated with 
difficulties trading across ethnic and/or international borders, as discussed in the 
text.  Our model draws on Fafchamps (2001), who analyzed equilibrium prices in a 
single remote location as a Cournot equilibrium among outside suppliers.  Our 
analysis treats the source and destination locations symmetrically, allowing 
arbitrageurs to move the commodity in either direction and assuming that they 
exploit their local market power in both locations.  
 
Assume, then, that traders are spatial arbitrageurs who transport an agricultural 
commodity (millet) from a market where the price is low to a market where the 
price is high.  There are two spatially separated markets for millet; market X has 
net export supply curve: 
 
 /0 
 10  23 (1) 
 
and market M has net import demand curve 
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If there is no trade, the autarky prices will prevail 8/0 
 109 '/4 
 14:7  We assume 
that in the current period 10 ; 14! so that market X has comparative advantage as 
an exporter. 
 
There is a set of traders who can move millet from the export market to the import 
market.  To do so, trader i has to purchase an amount < of millet from the export 
market, transport it to the import market, and sell it there.  Traders are Cournot 
competitors who operate by taking the amount of arbitrage trade being done by 
their competitors as given, and then choosing the optimal prices to set in the two 
markets and (therefore) the optimal amount to trade.  In their price-setting 
behavior, they operate as a monopsonist with respect to the residual export supply 
curve in the export market and a monopolist with respect to the residual demand 
curve in the import market.   
 
If the amount being traded by competitors is fixed at => (equaling the sum of < done 
by competitors), then the residual net export supply and net import demand curves 
facing trader i are: 
 /0 
 ?10  2=>@  2< 
 (3) 
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/4 
 ?14 5 2=>@ 5 2< 
 
The objective of trader i is to maximize revenue net of variable costs.  If variable 
costs are zero (for simplicity; a constant marginal transaction cost can readily be 
accommodated), total revenue is just  
 
 A 
 8/4 5 /0:< 
 B14 5 10 5 C2=> 5 C2<D<7  (4) 
 
The first-order condition for the choice of < is EA E<F 
 G! or 
 
 B14 5 10 5 C2=>D 
 H2< ! (5) 
 
which yields an optimum because EA E< 
 5H2 ; G7F ''If we impose symmetry 
across traders, then => 
 8I 5 J:< where n is the number of traders engaged in 
arbitrage.  The solution for < is then 
 
  <8I: 
 KLMKNO8PQ:7 (6)  
 
Prices in each market are 
 
/08I: 
 10  II  J )
14 5 10C  
 (7) 
/48I: 
 14 5 II  J )
14 5 10C ! 
 
so the price gap is /4 5 /0 
 814 5 10: 8I  J:7F   The revenue of each trader in this 
symmetric equilibrium is 
 
 A8I: 
 O RKLMKNPQ S
7  (8) 
 
Suppose now that there is a fixed transaction cost C that any trader has to pay to 
operate arbitrage between the two villages.  This fixed transaction cost could arise 
from difficulties in trading across locations that differ by ethnicity (and/or by 
language or gender).  Entry of a single trader is profitable as long as A8G: T U7  If 
this condition holds, then in the absence of other barriers to entry, entry will occur 
until A8I: 
 U (remember, there are no variable costs by assumption).  The 
equilibrium number of traders therefore satisfies 
 
  I 
 V1W XY OZ 814 5 10: 5 J! G[. (9) 
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The number of active traders is therefore an increasing function of the autarky 
price gap (a measure of the gains from trade) and a decreasing function of 
transaction cost.   
 
The equilibrium price gap between the two markets is 
 
  /4 5 /0 
 KLMKNPQ 
 V\I]^C2U! 14 5 10_!  (10) 
 
which is an increasing function of the transaction cost.  If the absence of long-run 
relationships (for example, “networks”) in cross-ethnic trade translates into higher 
transaction costs, then we expect bigger price gaps between markets of different 
ethnicity than between markets of the same ethnicity.   
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Figure 1. International Borders and Ethnic Groups in Niger and (northern) Nigeria  
 
Notes: A map of the current ethnic and international borders for Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Niger and Nigeria, as well as the geographic location of major grain markets in these countries. 
Each color reflects the geographic location of different ethnic groups within Niger and the 
surrounding countries. As currently drawn, the ethnic boundaries appear to correspond to 
administrative (departmental) boundaries, which is not the case; in most cases the ethnic 
boundary is located within a particular department. Nevertheless, the map shows the general 
geographic locations of each group. Ethnic boundaries are created from the authors’ household 
and trader-level data collected between 2005 and 2007.
 Figure 2. Ethnic Composition of Markets with
Notes: This map was created using data from a field survey conducted in October 2011. The 
field survey collected data on the latitude and longitude of each village, the ethnic composition 
of each village as of October 2011, as well as at the time of Nigerien independence in 1960.  The 
categories included Hausa only, Zarma only, Fulani only, Hausa/Zarma, Hausa/Fulani, Z
Fulani, Hausa/Zarma/Fulani.  As there were not significant differences in
between 1960 and 2011, the data shown in this map are from October 2011.  Those villages with 
more than two ethnic groups (more specifically, at least a combination of the Hausa/Zarma
ethnic group) were used to define the ethnic “bo
for all markets in our sample.  
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Table 9: Differences in Trader-Level Characteristics between Hausa and Zarma 
Regions 
Variables: 
Hausa mean 
Unconditional 
difference in 
means 
Conditional 
difference in 
means 
 (1) (2) (3)   
Panel A: Market Institutions 
Road quality (1 = paved, 0 = unpaved) 0.49 0.16 0.05 
(0.46) (0.43) 
Market tax (CFA/kg) 0.75 0.17 0.17 
(0.16) (0.16) 
Number of police controls 2.79 -1.79 -1.75 
(0.91) (0.85) 
Number of traders on market 85.00 1.55 3.02 
(22.36) (24.66) 
Association membership 0.47 -0.14 -0.06 
(0.08) (0.11) 
Years of education 0.18 -0.09 -0.06 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Change original market 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Years of experience 15.40 -2.92 -2.09 
(1.61) -1.74 
Number of employees 4.00 -0.56 -0.14 
(0.83) (1.32) 
Panel B: Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
Age 44.13 -0.91 -0.64 
(2.69) (2.73) 
Gender 0.06 0.22*** 
(0.06) 
Speak Hausa language 1 -0.80*** -0.40*** 
(0.06) (0.05) 
Panel C: Trading Behavior 
Retailer 0.27 0.04 -0.01 
(0.07) (0.15) 
Number of markets followed 3.77 -0.80 -0.50 
(0.67) (0.57) 
Number of market contacts 3.33 -0.18 -0.34 
(0.50) (0.51) 
Use mobile phone for trading 0.38 0.06 0.05 
(0.07) (0.10) 
Number of purchase and sales markets 4.15 -0.75* -0.70** 
(0.29) (0.22) 
55 
 
Trade in markets within a 50-km 
radius 0.94 -0.11* -0.12* 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Trade in markets across the Hausa-
Zarma border 0.02 0.04 0.03 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Panel D: Borrowing and Lending 
Have financial account 0.24 -0.13 -0.12 
(0.08) (0.09) 
Obtained loan for trading purposes 0.41 -0.02 0.03 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Borrowed from fellow trader 0.50 0.03 0.12 
(0.19) (0.16) 
Borrowed from friend/family 0.22 0.31* 0.32** 
(0.14) (0.12) 
Able to obtain supplier credit 0.70 0.01 0.08 
(0.16) (0.13) 
Purchased on credit since last harvest 0.60 0.11 0.20* 
(0.14) (0.10) 
Duration of supplier credit (days) 17.42 -10.51* -9.53 
(4.90) (4.89) 
Implicit monthly interest rate (%) 0.07 0.09 0.12 
(0.08) (0.12) 
Willing to provide client credit 0.85 0.05 0.06 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Sold on credit since last harvest 0.75 0.08 0.10* 
(0.06) (0.05) 
Duration of client credit (days) 24.00 -14.60 -14.57* 
(7.70) (7.07) 
Implicit monthly interest rate (%) 0.17 -0.05 -0.03 
    (0.12) (0.12) 
Notes: Data are from the Niger trader survey and secondary sources collected by one of the authors 
between 2005 and 2007. There are 400 traders across 35 markets. Column (1) shows the mean in 
Hausa markets located within 50 km of the Hausa-Zarma “border.” Column (2) shows the 
unconditional difference in means between Hausa and Zarma border markets. Column (3) shows 
the conditional difference in means between Hausa and Zarma border markets, controlling for the 
gender of the trader. Standard errors robust to market level clustering are reported in parentheses. * 
significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure A1. Kernel Density Estimates for Millet and Cowpea Price Residuals
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Figure A2. CFA/Naira Exchange Rate between 1999 and 2007
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